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The purpose of this paper is to examine how ‘standards setters’ might directly or indirectly affect decisions on the acceptability of public risk. ‘Standards setters’ have been interpreted as including obvious standards-setting agencies such as CEN and BSI, but also those other agencies which disseminate formal advice on how risk should be managed. These include regulators like the HSE and FSA, as well as some voluntary organisations and single interest groups.

It is concluded that the activities of standards setters can, via a range of mechanisms (eleven are proposed and there are no doubt more), impinge upon risk decision making in the public arena, and that the impact can be large. The publication and promulgation of advice by standards-setters has both a direct effect upon how public bodies manage risk to the public, and an indirect effect, perhaps as strong or stronger, via the courts and insurers, who also take careful note of this advice and use it as guidance for their own purposes. There is of course nothing amiss with the general idea of the production of standards and advice as a means of managing risk, and this strategy is entirely consistent with the recommendations emanating from the Robens Committee in 1972.

However, the paper concludes that the important role which standards setters play in the management of public risk could be enhanced, and makes a number of suggestions to that effect. These include the issuance of new guidance on how public risk should be assessed. Current methodologies and advice are largely drawn, for historical reasons, from the workplace, and in particular make little or no explicit reference to the need to weigh the benefits of public places and activities in risk decisions. The emphasis, nowadays, is very much upon risk minimisation to the exclusion of all else. 





























Main paper: Standard setters and public risk 
1. Introduction
Through BERR the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council (RRAC) has commissioned a suite of papers examining how key groups of ‘risk actors’ influence risk decision making in the context of public risks, and how, in particular, their involvement might lead to an approach to public risk which amplifies or diminishes the relative importance of specific hazards. The RRAC gives a broad definition of public risks as the full range of social, environmental, economic, technical, health and other threats for which Government is considered to have some overarching responsibility. Our task here is to investigate the influence, direct or indirect, of one group of risk actors, referred to as ‘Standard setters,’ and our approach is primarily, though not exclusively, to do this through the medium of health and safety. We recognise, as did the RRAC in its definition of public risks, that standards setters influence many other things of importance to society, but we believe that many of the factors observed in the health and safety domain are present elsewhere. Secondly, standards setters have been given a particularly significant role in the health and safety sector. Thirdly, compliance with trade professional practices or received professional wisdom has traditionally been a cast-iron defence to negligence claims.​[1]​
 
In fact, the importance of voluntary standards, codes of practice and guidance notes in the UK’s approach to the management of risk can be traced back to the 1972 Robens Report. As this report says: “We recommend that in future no statutory regulation should be made before detailed consideration has been given to whether objectives might adequately be met by a non-statutory code of practice or standards.”​[2]​ Thus, the subsequent 1974 Health and Safety at Work etc Act (HSWA) replaced the pre-existing detailed and prescriptive industry regulations with a broad goal-setting, non-prescriptive model, based in part at least on the view that ‘those that create risk are best placed to manage it.’ In this system, regulations are designed to express goals and principles. These are then supported by standards, codes of practice and guidance,​[3]​ only a few of which are mandated with the rest being voluntary. ‘Voluntary’ is used here in the sense of not being mandated by statute.  

In practice compliance with standards may be required by contractual conditions, licensing regimes, product certification requirements or as a result of customer expectation which in turn may be based on pressures, real or perceived, from the legal process, insurers, or wider public expectations. In particular, it is common practice in the lower courts to use the extent to which a defendant has or has not complied with standards or advisory documents as a powerful aid in determining culpability. This anxiety about potential liability permeates the whole chain of command relating to any decision about public risk, with each ‘actor’ seeking to protect his position. In the present climate this process tends to be dominated by those who are most risk averse, and who set the most stringent safety requirements. Providers may thus feel they have no choice but to comply even where standards are discretionary. They may even feel that they have to do more than standards require.

The term “standards” is commonly taken to mean documents which prescribe in some detail the requirements necessary to make particular articles or processes  fit and acceptable for their intended purpose.  For the purposes of this work we have taken a broader definition to include codes of practice and documents which provide more general advice and guidance of an aspirational or informative nature.

We commence the main part of our report in section 2 by considering the range of risk actors plausibly embraced by the term ‘Standards setters.’ Section 3 then describes the scope of their activities and their motivations for involvement in public risk. In Section 4 we outline briefly the UK’s underlying approach to the making of decisions involving risk. The purpose of this is to provide a baseline against which to consider, in Section 5, how Standards setters might be implicated in the amplification or attenuation of actions taken by them, or others, in response to public risk. Section 6 addresses the importance of these actors in public risk decision making. Finally, Section 7 proposes for consideration a range of ‘levers for change.’

2. Description of the Actor Group
Who are the ‘Standard setters’? Most obviously these would include agencies like the British Standards Institution (BSI) and its European and international equivalents. Most standards are in the form of technical specifications for the guidance of manufacturers and purchasers in choosing a product which is safe and fit for its intended purpose.  Examples include product standards for cements used in concrete, replacement windows, electrical equipment, street furniture, and so on.

More recently, there are other types of standard which describe management systems. Some of these, such as BS 8800:2004 on occupational safety management systems, are important here as they set out approaches to risk decision making which impact upon the management of public risk. In addition, there are numerous other agencies involved in issuing instructions, such as approved codes of practice (ACOPs) and guidance notes, of which HSE’s ACOP for the 2007 Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (CDM, 2007) is a good example. Compliance with some of these is required by statute, whereas others have advisory status, although compliance with documents such as HSE ACOPs is compelling.​[4]​ Besides regulatory bodies, such as the HSE, DEFRA, OFSTED and the FSA, consumer campaign groups (e.g. RoSPA), professional education and training bodies such as The Institute of Risk Management (IRM), consortia of public or private bodies such as The Institute of Sport and Recreation Management (ISRM) and The Visitor Safety in the Countryside Group (VSCG), and individual public or private agencies, all have an impact, through their advice and publications, upon the way in which public risks are managed. 

The international dimension is also increasingly important, with legislation originating at EU level setting down ‘essential safety requirements’ which may be satisfied by demonstrating compliance with ‘harmonised’ standards promulgated by CEN, the European Committee for Standardization which draws up voluntary technical specifications to help achieve the Single Market in Europe. Many other international agencies, like the World Health Organisation (WHO) which promulgates environmental quality criteria, and the International Standards Organisation are influential. Even at the level of individual organisations, such as financial institutions, health trusts, law enforcement agencies, the courts, fire authorities, trade associations and local authorities, internal standardised working practices, especially procurement practices, influence the approach taken to public risk.

3. The Actor Group’s History, Scope and Motivation
3.1 History
Standards making  can be traced  back to the  early industrial revolution when industrialists realised there were mutual benefits to be gained from having items such as screw threads which were interchangeable between manufacturers (Whitworth, 1840), and materials such as cast iron with known composition and mechanical properties.  Users of one of the greatest benefits from the industrial revolution, the railways, had their lives made simpler when  the need for timetables led to the standardisation of time across the country in 1847.  Since then there has been a huge growth in the production of technical standards assisted by national (e.g. BSI, founded in 1901) and later, international bodies. These standards effectively consolidate knowledge acquired, sometimes in tragic circumstances, into a body of good practice. Many of them impact on public risk.

Over time the scope of standards has expanded to bring in management and business process topics, recent topics from BSI including website standards, property life cycle costing, and business continuity.  We have referred elsewhere in this report to the safety management standard, BS8800: 2004.  Thus the scope of standards published has expanded from the purely narrow and prescriptive to broader based guidance on management processes.  Figure 1 illustrates how these types of standards can impact an organisation.

BSI’s current top selling standard is the quality management standard BS EN ISO 9001, derived from the earlier BS 5750, in turn derived from the MoD DEFSTAN 05-21 series.  Regulatory bodies such as the HSE and Marine & Coastguard Agency (MCA) also produce national standards in the form of codes of practice and guidance, addressing principally occupational risks, exceptions including the HSE’s guidance on the safety of fairground rides, HSG 175.

In parallel with the extensive standards-making at national and international levels, there is much standard-making activity at sector and company level, including trade and professional associations. This can be in the form of prescribed company processes, or general guidance.  Examples of these include the public risk management guidance published by the Visitor Safety in the Countryside Group, and public space design guidance published by CABE.

Increasing recognition that ‘those nearest the risk are best placed to control it’ may lead to an increase in the numbers of standards produced more locally.

Figure 1: Types of standard and areas of influence 


3.2 Interests and motivation
We perceive a complex mix of reasons why companies, associations, and government departments, agencies, and individuals put so much effort and attach so much importance to the production of standards.  These include for public bodies:
	to help implement policies
	to clarify what is required to comply with legislation (an activity given a major boost with the arrival of post-Robens goal-setting legislation.)
	to publicise compliant solutions
and for businesses:
	to help implement business objectives
	encourage continuous performance improvement  (which in the context of public safety standards may mean a pursuit of zero risk)
	spreading the business risk of new management approaches, technologies or applications
	consolidating best practice in established areas of business or activity
	encouraging consistency across a given business sector (a consistent risk management approach across a sector will be much harder for a regulator to attack)
	promotion of a product line, service,  or profession
	managing knowledge  (Standards can be an effective way of retaining and passing on acquired knowledge)
	survival.  Businesses which depend on the production of standards and certification and compliance testing services have a strong vested interest in the health and growth of standards activity. 

Business interest in standards is likely to have been heightened by globalisation.

Whatever the motivation of the originator, which may range from the truly altruistic to cynical self-interest, success in terms of developing the standard through to fruition and seeing its widespread adoption, will depend on building a constituency of support.  Failure to achieve this support brings with it a danger of the originators becoming isolated in their community and the standard becoming irrelevant.

The originators will measure success in terms of their interests and motivations.  They will certainly be seeking to maximise their rewards (however they be measured) but it cannot automatically be presumed that they will be seeking a carefully considered risk-benefit balance for the public, or risk minimisation (where this may be desirable).  Standards setters might therefore be implicated in the amplification or attenuation of public risk in response to the actions taken by them.

3.3 Why the involvement with public risk? 
Risks to the public which arise from goods, services provision, facilities, management systems and so on, pervade the areas of activity for which standards-making is seen by business and regulators as offering business advantage. Public risk and standards setters are closely intertwined. This inter-involvement reduces when the activity in question moves beyond the boundaries of standards and requires new or innovative approaches (which if successful and there is sufficient demand, may result in new standards-making activity).

4. The UK’s Approach to Decision Making and Risk Management
In this section we outline briefly the UK’s underlying approach to the making of decisions involving risk. The purpose of this is to provide a baseline against which to consider, in Section 5, how standards can amplify and attenuate public risk.

Although not as widely appreciated as it might be, the UK has evolved a highly pragmatic and some say revolutionary​[5]​ approach to decision making including those decisions involving public risk. The roots can be traced back over centuries to the formation of the insurance industry, evolving case law, and the implementation of philosophies of environmental pollution control such as Best Practicable Means (BPM). To skip a long story, the outcomes of these thought processes can today be witnessed in key documents and legislation, including notably HM Treasury’s Green Book, the Health and Safety at Work etc Act (HSWA), and documents of the HSE,​[6]​ as well as in the day-to-day decision making processes of agencies like the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NIHCE), and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and its parent body the Department for Transport. 

The key feature of the UK’s approach is encapsulated within the meaning of the term ‘reasonable practicability.’​[7]​ Thus, when a risk is identified the general aim is not to eliminate nor even to minimise it, but to reduce it until ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP). Effectively what this means is that for each hazard identified, the risk of harm and consequence should first be estimated. If above some threshold, risk reduction measures should be applied so long as the benefits of the intervention, in terms of risk reduction, exceed its cost as measured in money, time and trouble. This is essentially a utilitarian philosophy, the aim of which is to maximise the social benefits achievable from a finite pot of resources. In recognition of some shortcomings of utilitarianism, notably its failure to deal with distributional issues (i.e. maximising social good overall could still leave some individuals or vulnerable groups to face an unacceptably high level of risk), the approach is nowadays ‘softened’ though not overidden by the incorporation of public concerns. This can be implemented by a variety of means ranging from research into public willingness-to-pay for risk reductions, to the factoring in of concerns into decision processes (as in HM Treasury’s Orange Book), to various forms of public communication, consultation or partnership in decision making.

The key elements apparent in this approach are value-for-money, including those situations affecting safety and health, effectiveness, the use of scientific evidence wherever feasible (evidence-based decision making), and sensitivity to public concerns. Thus, The Better Regulation Task Force identified the principles of good regulation as the targeting of action on the most serious risks; consistency of approach in similar circumstances; proportionality – action should be commensurate to risk; and transparency and accountability.

5. Risk Amplification and Attenuation
The central task of this document is to identify mechanisms whereby standards setters could influence the balance of risk decision making as described above. In this section we describe mechanisms illustrated with case examples.

Mechanism1: Absence of a consistent and clear philosophy of risk control
The philosopher David Seedhouse, whose work centres on health promotion, has described how there is turmoil within the field of health promotion because different health promoters have different philosophies of health promotion.​[8]​ This leads to deep tensions, inconsistencies of approach, and inhibits performance. The same tensions are evident in the management of public and occupational risk.​[9]​ 

For example, there is a constant tendency to talk of risk minimisation or risk elimination whereas the actual philosophy, as set out in the HSWA and summarised above in Section 4, is to reduce risks so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP). In our experience understanding of SFAIRP is very limited, even amongst practitioners of risk assessment, particularly those operating in the public domain. This is unsurprising considering that many official publications appear either reluctant to spell out the philosophy, or juxtapose it with references to risk minimisation or elimination without acknowledging the essential inconsistencies of these approaches. HSE’s best-selling and highly-influential HSG65​[10]​ lists (p11), for the purpose of guiding ‘directors, managers, health and safety professionals and employee representatives who want to improve health and safety in their organisation,’ examples of  statements of ‘health and safety philosophy.’ The statements supplied refer to ‘risk minimisation,’ ‘total safety,’ and ‘all accidents and ill health are preventable.’ There is no mention of the philosophy embedded in the HSWA until a brief entry (p46), which is followed by a longer description of risk control systems (pp49-51), all of which emphasise either risk minimisation or elimination. This is significant because HSG65 has, for example, influenced the drafting of the important standard BS 8800:2004, the Guide to Occupational health and safety management systems.​[11]​ A reading of this BS soon shows that while this too incorporates some reference to reasonable practicability (e.g. p1, p25) without definition, it quickly reverts to talk of hazard elimination and risk minimisation (e.g. p5).  This also serves to illustrate a key difference between the management of occupational and public risk. In the former, elimination of hazards may be a preferred course of management action as the risk itself has only disbenefits and it may be possible to eliminate it without affecting wealth creation. In some cases it may even be possible to eliminate risk and enhance wealth creation. In a public risk setting, however, the removal of a hazard may well require the cessation or curtailment of the associated activity and the loss of benefits derived from it.  Indeed, in some cases, the risk may itself be perceived as part of the benefit.

Another example lies in the HSE’s informative document, ‘Thirty years on and looking forward,’​[12]​ according to which ‘the central task remains to minimise the risk of harm and create a society where risk is properly appreciated, understood and managed.’ This statement illustrates the conundrum, for it immediately raises the question of whether ‘risk minimisation’ should be the goal of a society that properly appreciates, understands and manages risk, and indeed one which has expressed its preference for a different philosophy in a carefully-worded statute (the HSWA). Indeed, towards the end of the document, a line more consistent with the HSWA is taken: ‘sensible health and safety is about managing risks not eliminating them.’ 

These inconsistencies are further compounded by the adoption for the first time of ‘concrete health and safety targets’ (30 years on p 3) by the DETR and the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) in 2002.​[13]​ The risk targets call, for example, for the incidence rate of fatalities and major injuries to be reduced by 10% by 2010, and duty holders are urged to connect these goals to their health and safety policies. This approach is of course political, just as the HSWA’s framing around reasonable practicability is also a political choice, but the issue is that the two approaches are based on different rationalities. The target-led approach pays no obvious heed to the opportunity cost of safety interventions, and might foster a free-for-all approach to the pursuance of risk interventions.

We note also that the HSE’s widely-used publication ‘Five steps to risk assessment’ has been simplified to the extent that while it refers to the requirement to protect people SFAIRP, no definition is given of this crucial term. An earlier version of ‘Five steps…’ stated that ‘it was obvious and that you can work it out for yourself’ but we doubt this. Indeed, during the 1980s Public Inquiry into the Sizewell B nuclear power station the Chief Inspector, Sir Frank Layfield, himself asked the HSE to explain the term, culminating in the publication by HSE of the landmark document, ‘The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations’ in 1992. Our experience is that most people continue to be unaware of or do not understand this key philosophy. Coupled with the drive to meet targets, this fosters an emphasis on risk minimisation over other socially desirable goals.

Mechanism 2: Failure to give due weight to benefits in decisions about public risk
On the face of it one might think that the HSWA applies purely to workplaces, but section 3 of the Act deals with persons not in employment who may be put at risk by work activity, and section 4 with visits to premises, and so its coverage has been taken to encompass many other places including parks, waterways, sports grounds, the countryside and public places of many kinds, which can be classified as someone’s premises. Given that the Act is now taken to apply to so many public venues, it is unsurprising that advice and risk assessment tools initially developed for the workplace have come to be widely used for assessing public risks too. However, a notable feature of standard workplace advice and risk assessment tools is that they very seldom make reference to the benefits of things or activities. The general approach can be summarised as: identify hazards, consider who might be exposed, assess the risk, and consider the adequacy of existing and potential control measures in accordance with a hierarchy which favours elimination of hazards.

When applied to the public arena, this logic, if unchecked, leads inexorably to the elimination of countless features and activities, particularly so where children are involved because of the nation’s sensitivity towards the safety of the young. Concerns have been expressed by many agencies including the BRTF about risk decisions which have appeared to act against the public interest, such as the removal of mature trees from cities, to the prevention of access to natural environments, bespoiling of historic monuments with fences and signs, and closing swimming pools for which the costs of complying with safety standards result in transferring and elevating the risk when children chose instead to swim in docks or canals.

What is missing is that in public life, things and activities are valued because of the benefits which they bring, which can be in many different forms: tranquillity of an unspoilt riverside walk; shade of a tree;  architectural beauty of a city square; and even the opportunity to consciously take a risk and so challenge one’s skills and capabilities. As Adams has described,​[14]​ everyone has a propensity to take risk and individual risk-taking decisions represent a balancing act in which perceptions of risk are weighed against propensity to take risk. An example would be a rock climber deciding which route to take up a rock face, but even mundane activities like deciding when and where to cross the road involve similar considerations.

So the difficulty here is that if standard workplace risk assessment tools are transferred to the public sphere, the lack of emphasis given to benefits in these protocols could lead to decisions which seek to control risk at the neglect of benefits.​[15]​ This would amount to an unexpressed political choice to elevate safety above other things valued by society.

It could be argued, and no doubt would be, that the HSWA is the law and where it applies it must be obeyed, and if the law does not mention benefits then so be it. However, one of the several definitions which have been given of reasonable practicability, states as follows:

“It is the duty of an employer, in considering whether some precaution should be taken against foreseeable risk, to weigh, on the one hand, the magnitude of the risk, the likelihood of an accident happening and the possible seriousness of the consequences if an accident does happen, and, on the other hand, the difficulty and expense and any other disadvantage of taking the precaution.”​[16]​

This definition refers to ‘any other disadvantage’ of taking a precaution, perhaps opening the door for the consideration of benefits of things/activities and the impact upon them of risk interventions. Counsel’s Opinion​[17]​ about the legitimacy of considering the benefits of things and activities in the context of play provision has also supported the consideration of benefits in decision making about public risk:

“The organisation’s play policy and Managing Risk in Play Provision provide a sound basis for defending against liability claims: “Where there has been careful risk assessment, resulting in a conclusion that it is permissible for play to involve a risk of injury, by reason of the resultant benefits, I am confident that Courts would be sympathetic to a Defendant, in the event of an accident and subsequent litigation.”

The importance of considering other factors when making risk decisions is actually identified in one important ACOP known as the Construction (Design and Management) regulations. Here the HSE state that:

“Designers have to weigh many factors as they prepare their designs.  Health and safety considerations have to be weighed alongside other considerations including cost, fitness-for-purpose, aesthetics, buildability, maintainability and environmental impact. CDM 2007 allows designers to take due account of other relevant design considerations. The regulations do not prescribe solutions but require designers to weigh the various factors and reach reasoned, professional decisions."

Taking this a step further, the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) will in autumn 2008 publish a document on children’s play provision which recommends the use of risk-benefit assessment in place of traditional risk assessment. We believe that this will be the first document of its kind to take this position. The document has been endorsed by the HSE.

The Health and Safety at Work Act is criminal law, but many organisations are concerned (justifiably or not) by the prospect of being sued through the civil courts.  The Occupiers Liability Acts​[18]​ places on occupiers  a duty of care to visitors (and trespassers), however, the Acts do not extend this duty to adults who willingly and knowingly undertake risky activities.  There is a lesser duty of care in respect of land made accessible through rights of way legislation.​[19]​

Mechanism 3: Inadequate consultation
The term ‘absent voices’ was used by Graham and Wiener in their book about risk interventions.​[20]​ This refers to the absence of key parties from negotiations at a time when e.g. standards and advice are being drafted. If it is accepted (Mechanism 2) that decisions about public risks should involve consideration of benefits, then advisory documents should clearly be drafted by people with knowledge of both risk control and benefit provision and how to strike an appropriate balance, pointing perhaps to the need for a new kind of expertise. Traditionally though, safety standards have been largely the domain of those with interests in risk control. Indeed, BSEN 1176-1:1998 on the safety of playground equipment goes so far as to say “It is not the purpose of this standard to encompass play value.”​[21]​ Members of that Committee have subsequently maintained that this statement is untrue and that benefits of play equipment were considered in deciding how risky equipment might be, and the updated version to be published in 2008 now states that benefits have been considered. We believe this claim, that benefits were considered in writing the 1998 Standard, to be true, because how could one permit children to be exposed, as they are in playgrounds, to unprotected drops, fireman’s poles and the like unless the obvious risks of harm were considered to be offset by the benefits? However, the fact that such a striking denial could have existed in a standard for a decade points at the least to some possible confusion over the role of benefits, and raises several questions. One is about the extent to which benefits were actually factored into the design considerations inherent in the standard. Another is about the relative contribution to the standard of agencies concerned with promoting play’s benefits. It is noted that there currently exists a widespread belief that benefits of play, including play for its own sake, having fun, promotion of physical and psychological wellbeing, learning to socialise and the opportunity to learn about risk, have been undervalued and that a generation of children have lost out as a consequence.​[22]​

It has been an enduring criticism of many standards making bodies that those carrying out the drafting have been too remote from those who have to implement and deal with the consequences.  Recent attempts to improve stakeholder involvement and consultation have, in some cases, ultimately proved effective, but this can require expenditure of considerable time and pressure.

Case study: During 2007-8 BS 8516, a new standard on tree inspections was being drafted. This, coupled with recent legal cases, gave rise to much concern within the landowning sector and the standard attracted considerable adverse media attention. A primary concern was that the standard might be disproportionate and that it had not had sufficiently broad input during drafting. Although the drafting committee had every intention of putting the draft out for consultation, it is well-known that turning back the tide at that stage can be a difficult process. Following concerted efforts, it is understood that a significant number of organisations and individuals have expressed the opinion that a BS on tree inspection is not appropriate at this time.

The issue of special interest groups dominating standards-setting processes to the detriment of wider interests is exemplified by the following case study reported by personal injury barrister and Go Ape director Jerome Mayhew.​[23]​

Case study: “In my industry (high ropes), we have had direct experience of the threat of standardisation. In early 2006, we became aware of negotiations to create a European standard for the ropes course industry. Despite being probably the largest operator of such courses in Europe, we had not been informed of this proposal by any trade group or government body, and only learned of it by chance from a French contact. Given the potential impact of such a standard on our business – and the wider industry – we decided to get involved.

We contacted the British Standards Institution (BSI), only to be told that such a committee did not exist. In the end, it took six months, an uninvited arrival at a meeting in Antwerp, and numerous conversations with BSI to receive acknowledgement that the process was underway, and then to be affiliated to the committee as national experts.

The make up of both the national and European committees was very surprising. The national committee was dominated by a particular section of the industry that happened to know of its existence. Both were dominated by representatives of manufacturers, and were not truly representative of the industry that they were proposing to regulate.

In our experience, the quality of the draft standard was massively affected by the quality and objectives of the committee members. We felt that some committee members were seeking to use the standard to stifle competition and restrict innovation within the industry.

By grasping the nettle and forcing the system to allow us to get involved, we were able to radically alter the composition of the draft standard. As with all products of committees, there are still parts of the final version with which we are unhappy. However, during the course of our involvement we were able to change what would have been a deeply restricting and damaging document into what should be a positive contribution to the design and operation processes.”

Mechanism 4: Failure to screen risk interventions for unintended consequences
Graham and Wiener also discuss the phenomenon of ‘unintended consequences’ which they believe is rife in public agency policy making. The BRC has itself drawn attention to this phenomenon.​[24]​ The issue is that all societal, including risk, interventions, whether about health, safety or some other issue, have ‘ripple on’ effects beyond those of the primary intention. Thus, most drugs, medicines and therapeutic treatments have side effects, some of which are serious and undesirable. Sometimes these effects are attenuated and at others amplified by the complex workings of society.​[25]​ Graham and Wiener recommend, as do we, that standards and advice should be routinely screened for unintended consequences, perhaps by the application of properly-constituted brain storming sessions similar to those used in HAZOP studies, both at the time of drafting and during regular reviews. 

Case Study:  Requiring barriers to be fitted to watersides edges in the interests of preventing falling in was found to hinder the rescue of people from the water, and encourage loitering and anti-social behaviour.

Case Study: ‘Improving’ the standards specified for an emergency services vehicle led to a substantial increase in weight resulting in reduced mobility and ability to reach terrains accessed previously.

Unintended consequences can also arise through inappropriate use of standards intended for other purposes, an example being the application of  highway standards to waterway bridges.  This can arise from the expectations of the public, regulators, and courts that some standard should be in place and where this does not exist, the ‘nearest’ seemingly relevant one is chosen, sometimes without due evaluation being given to its relevance or the potential for introducing undesirable or irrelevant features.

Case study: Port Ramsgate commissioned the design and manufacture of a linkspan structure which provided shore-to-ship access for foot passengers at all tide heights. The linkspan carried several thousand passengers each day.  In September 1994, some six months after it was commissioned, the linkspan collapsed resulting in the deaths of six passengers and seriously injuring seven.  The resulting criminal prosecution under section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act resulted in the award of fines totalling £2.5 million to the client for the works (Port Ramsgate), the designers/constructors (FEAB/FKAB), and the technical plan approvers (Lloyds Register).  Key points to emerge from the investigation were that the client and designer failed to specify appropriate civil and structural standards or to take appropriate advice.  The designers only made reference to Lloyds Register's Lifting Appliance rules, which were not suitable for the application.

Subsequently, British Standard 6349 Part 8 (Code of Practice for the design of Ro-Ro ramps, linkspans, and walkways.) was published in 2007.  Current HSE guidance to their inspectors in respect of linkspans stresses the importance of the selection of appropriate standards and how compliance with them is verified.

Mechanism 5: Failure to complete the ROAMEF cycle
ROAMEF is an acronym for Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, Monitoring (part of implementation), Evaluation and Feedback, and refers to a government-recommended approach to policy appraisal.​[26]​ The key feature is that the process of making an intervention, safety or otherwise, should be seen as a cyclical process. This is essential when dealing with complex systems - anything involving people’s behaviour is likely to be complex – because results are often uncertain.​[27]​ Commonly though, risk interventions are not thoroughly evaluated after implementation,​[28]​ either for effectiveness or unintended consequences. This may be because those who devise risk interventions lack the necessary skills for evaluation, or because no budget has been assigned for that stage. Alternatively, some originators of interventions favour particular approaches and do not seek to question their effectiveness. For example, some believe that “physical engineering controls and safeguards are more reliable than relying solely on people”​[29]​ and thus favour measures such as fences, barriers, traffic lights, the wearing of helmets and the like. Within a factory environment this type of control may be legitimate, but in the realm of public space there are grounds to question the widespread adoption of these methods, both because evidence that they work is lacking and because of their unintended consequences for public life. CABE Space, for example, has been instrumental in trying to get designers of public space to be more creative, even in the face of risk aversion. Likewise, concepts such as that of ‘shared space’ in traffic engineering (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Traffic_engineering_(transportation)" \o "Traffic engineering (transportation)​) offer alternatives which may be more effective in terms of risk control and beneficial in the round. Shared space in this context refers to the blurring or removal of the distinction between space designated for automobiles and space designated for pedestrians and bicycles. In this manner, the concept is intended to reduce the adverse effects of conventional road layouts, based on the observation that individuals' behaviour (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Social_behavior" \o "Social behavior​) in traffic (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Traffic" \o "Traffic​) is more positively affected by the built environment (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Built_environment" \o "Built environment​) of the public space than it is by conventional traffic control devices (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Vienna_Convention_on_Road_Signs_and_Signals" \o "Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals​) (signals, signs, road markings, etc.) and regulations (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Rules_of_the_road" \o "Rules of the road​).​[30]​ A pre-requisite for success of these schemes is that the hazards must be obvious and risks taken voluntarily.  Determination of the outcome of the contest between engineering style solutions and social ‘shared space’ style concepts in public space, currently unresolved, demands completion of the ROAMEF cycle. 

Case study: Inadequate monitoring of visitor foot-traffic at a major visitor attraction only came to light when an accident occurred to a person using a wet and slippery informal route which became established as a result of the inadequate routing of the metalled designed routes. A cycle of monitoring and review would have revealed the deficiencies in the original design.

Mechanism 6: The way in which standards and advice are used and viewed by the legal process
As noted in the introduction, compliance with trade professional practices or received professional wisdom has traditionally been seen as a defence to negligence claims and in the lower courts at least this is frequently the situation. This places a huge pressure on providers of public goods and services to comply with every standard and piece of advice available, even where it is not strictly relevant or admissible.​[31]​ 

Case Study:  An inspector required the fitting of edge protection to a dock side in accordance with the dated Docks Regulations despite a risk assessment showing  that such a move would increase the risk to the predominantly leisure users of the dock.

Coupled with this, there is often a misplaced faith in the scientific rigour of the evidence-base of technical standards which results in cases being decided on the basis of a minute attention to technical measurement. Here Aristotle’s advice that “It is the mark of an instructed mind to rest easy with the degree of precision which the nature of the subject permits and not seek exactness where only an approximation of the truth is possible”​[32]​ is apposite. It is also the situation that many standards are not based on risk assessment as such, but a host of other considerations. Even in technical areas the uncertainties associated with risk analysis are often considerable, so although risk assessments may provide a framework for a standard the drafting is still heavily dependent on the knowledge and experience of the technical specialists and their judgement. This can leave the drafting process vulnerable to a tendency to make standards more onerous than the actual risk warrants, and to ‘ratcheting’ up of standards with each review cycle. There is also ample evidence of the fallibility of expert judgements.​[33]​

Case study:  Specifications for certain military equipment were ratcheted up at each review cycle without the benefit of an analysis of need. The results of this repeated ratcheting were manifest in increased costs and reduced effectiveness, more turning out to be less.

So while it is often presumed that compliance with a standard is a proof of non-liability in claims, the possibility remains that substitution of standards-compliance with the statutorily-required risk assessment is in contravention of the HSWA and the MHSWA Regulations, especially so if an assessment of the relevance of the standard to the risk in question has not been carried out. Courts need to be aware of this and of the primacy of risk assessment as the decision tool. In fact, the primacy of risk assessment provides an important benefit to society in that, as intended by Robens, the final choice resides with the local decision maker and not with some, probably-remote, standards-setting or advisory body. Children’s play provision illustrates the benefit of local decision making, because the BSEN on play equipment appears to have been written with under 8 year olds in mind, whereas traditional playgrounds were intended for teenagers too. Thus, playgrounds, over recent decades, have become less challenging for older users and thus less interesting. Local managers might thus choose to deviate from the stipulations of standards which are less relevant to the community they serve, and subject to a proper risk assessment this ought to be a legitimate choice.  However, they would no doubt feel obliged to make the reasons for deviating from standards clear and robust, because of public and judicial expectations.

Case study: Regulators in the maritime area increasingly look to industry for the ‘local standards’ when contemplating new or revised regulations.

Case study: A restored heritage site was the subject of a notice from inspectors requiring modern edge protection to building regulations standards to be installed.  Apart from detracting from the appearance of the site, installing the modern fences would have under-mined the integrity of the heritage structures.  An adequate risk assessment was in place for managing the visitor risks.  The appeal continues.

Mechanism 7: Inappropriate use of the concept of ‘Best practice’
According to Tolley, it is arguable that specific safety requirements, e.g. those laid down in regulations, should be regarded as minimum standards, subject to the caveat that they do not impose a standard far in excess of the level of care likely to be taken by the reasonable man.​[34]​ The view that safety requirements, whether statutory or advisory, are minimum standards is widespread. This may be a legacy of the old prescriptive regulation days when all you had to do was comply with a list of requirement regardless of how relevant or complete. Whatever the origin, it creates a paradox. For public risks, standards should be optimised around the appropriate balance between risk of harm posed by a thing or an activity and the benefits of that thing or activity. Thus, the single-minded pursuit of either of these objectives is likely to perturb the balance away from the optimum. Best practice should therefore be seen as that point at which risk and benefit are optimised, and not as the point of lowest risk. 

Small and medium sized companies stand to benefit particularly well from soundly based ‘best practice’ guidance.  Despite the efforts of the HSE and the health and safety profession to present requirements in a simple manner, SMEs face a daunting and expensive task. Identification of good, industry-specific, and risk-based best practice, can help reduce much otherwise mundane and repetitious work, freeing resources to concentrate on the more difficult or productive tasks.

Case study:  A radical new design of transport structure was proposed. There were no standards available which specifically encompassed its design, construction and operation, however on the basis of an outline risk assessment it was possible to identify parts of existing standards which collectively could be regarded as ‘best practice’ for the project. This approach was submitted to the regulator and successfully applied.

Mechanism 8: Inappropriate use of the concept of ‘Gross disproportion’
Analogous to the issue of ‘what is best practice?’ is the matter of gross disproportion. This concept can be traced back to the seminal 1949 Edwards v National Coal Board case.​[35]​ In this case reasonable practicability was defined by Lord Asquith as follows:

“Reasonably practicable is a narrower term than ‘Physically possible’ and implies that a computation must be made […] in which the quantum of risk is placed in one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in time, trouble or money) is placed in the other and that, if it be shown that there is a great disproportion between them – the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice – the person upon whom the obligation is imposed discharges the onus which is upon him.”

In its much-valued and influential document ‘Reducing risk protecting people,’​[36]​ HSE says that it believes that duties to reduce risks until ALARP have not been complied with if the regime introduced by duty holders fails the ‘gross disproportion’ test. However, there are two grounds for querying this in the context of public risks. One is as above (Mechanism 7), namely that where the trade-off is between the risk reduction benefits of a measure and its costs (in terms of impacts on the benefits of a risky thing or activity), then this would be tantamount to a political choice to value safety more highly than benefits (which could include health). The other is a more academic but nonetheless serious argument related to the method of  valuation of the risk reduction benefits of safety interventions. At the time of the Edwards case the monetary value placed on a human life was very low, being based on a human capital valuation technique which uses lost earnings as its main input. In the present era, however, the value used is based on consumers’ willingness-to-pay for safety and is far greater in actual and real terms. Evans has surmised that the courts in the Edwards era were aware of the stinginess of the then current valuation, hence the use of gross disproportion, but that given the rectification of this problem through the introduction of willingness-to-pay valuation the concept is now redundant.​[37]​ Indeed, it would seem strange that some government agencies (DfT) would go to so much trouble to find out the appropriate value to use by asking consumers, and then for it to be effectively disregarded by others by the introduction of an arbitrary weighting factor.

Mechanism 9:Reluctance to recognise the need for duty holders to experiment and learn from experience
Management standards as written pay little heed to the need for duty holders responsible for public risk to be able to experiment (as in the example of traffic management and public access in High St Kensington), yet in dealing with complex systems (unavoidably the case when dealing with people, objects and the environment) the outcome of safety interventions and management interventions is largely a matter of judgement. If the need to trade-off benefits of things and activities against their risks is also accepted, the choice as to which route to take is even more uncertain. The implication is that duty holders may do everything to the best of their ability to make the right decisions, but subsequent experience might show that a choice was not for the best and in some cases the consequences could be serious. In the case of flood risk management, for example, there is a view that it is time to move away from hard engineering solutions to ones which are more natural and resilient. This approach to design requires risk-taking, however. A similar situation exists in relation to children’s play provision where the engineering approach to play design is being supplanted by more naturalistic designs with built in risk.​[38]​ Thus, there is a desire to increase risk-taking experiences, but how can this be achieved in a world which is slow to acknowledge the need to experiment?

Mechanism 10: Remoteness of standards bodies from end users
Completing the ROAMEF in the production or review of standards can take a considerable time for even the best run and managed processes. The greater the degree of international and inter-governmental involvement required, the longer the cycle, generally speaking.  The International Maritime Organisation is a good example of a standards making body working on a worldwide basis to establish and maintain maritime safety standards, however the need to reach consensus amongst participating governments often results in extended timescales to completion. 

Standards making bodies are generally more responsive to change the closer they are to the end users.  We believe there is much merit in encouraging ‘local’ standards making by appropriate industry, trade and professional bodies, but to establish and maintain the integrity of such arrangements requires appropriate governance to be in place.  This is something that RRAC may wish to consider further. 

Case study: A need to review the international standard for the stability of boats (ISO 12217) was identified following a capsize in the UK which resulted in a fatality, and more general concerns that the increasing trend in peoples' weight was progressively eroding the safety margins built into the standard.  The review process is underway but the international nature of the standard and the need for formulation, discussion, and agreement of changes means that the revised version is likely to take some years of work before it becomes generally available.  In the meantime, and recognising the need for more immediate action in the UK as a result of the fatal accident, the boating industry and its principal regulator have produced a non-statutory standard for use by the boat builders and operators which sets down stability standards to be followed until the revised international standard becomes available.

Mechanism 11: The contribution of some certification schemes to excessive control
There is a concern that where standards are mandated by regulation and require verification of compliance by third parties, this can lead to lead to an overly rigorous interpretation of what is required leading to excess costs and diversion of effort and resources from other areas.  Conversely, some standards will allow for the provider of an article or service to self-certify where the standard setter considers that the level of risk permits this.

Case study: Concern over the compliance of some leisure boats with self-certified standards has led to industry initiatives to provide greater levels of assurance and some licensing authorities to consider requiring verification by third parties.

6. The Extent of the Group’s Influence
6.1 Who sets standards?
The process of standards setting usually relies upon the efforts of committees or working groups. The most likely persons able to offer the considerable time necessary, and to be able to afford the travelling expenses (these are not normally reimbursed), are those with commercial interests, or those employed by organisations with a particular policy interest in the objective, and this is borne out by some of the case studies described. In the arena of public risks, there should be a counterbalance to these narrower interests, but representation of the wider public is problematic. It is sometimes asserted that national consumer groups represent the public and are able to be present on committees, but national consumer groups may also focus upon narrow issues such as consumer safety.

6.2 Standards setters’ interactions with others
Figure 2 shows a ‘simple’ version of an influence diagram with standards setters placed at the centre. Even ‘simple’ influence diagrams can be complicated and it is acknowledged that there are many more links than have been shown on this diagram. The arrows indicate the main interactions, their direction and strength (according to the thickness of the arrows) as we perceive them. We have no doubts that any such diagram has the potential to generate copious discussion and perhaps controversy.

As shown in Figure 2, we believe the strongest interactions occur with:

	Risk/Compliance managers (aka duty holders) in providing them with targets and guidance, as well as peer statements of what is perceived as current best practice
	Legal profession/courts (as benchmarks in determining what is best or acceptable practice)
	Insurers (in providing what they commonly take to be a benchmark of acceptable practice)
	Regulators (in setting down or guiding a route to best or acceptable practice)

We also show in Figure 2 additional pathways by which e.g. duty holders are affected by standards setters via the responses of either regulators or the courts to outputs of standards setting activities. Duty holders are important determiners of what the public actually gets at the end in the way of services or goods.

The diagram also suggests, controversially perhaps, that the strongest influence upon standards setters is private interests, although to a variable extent the public interest is accommodated, and the perspective of insurers.

Figure 2: Some of the pathways of influence centred upon standards setters (see text for details)
 
Earlier this report discussed whether these interactions raise or diminish perceptions of public risk and the consequent impacts on public affairs. There are evidently copious routes whereby standards setters impact upon public risk and these impacts can be serious.

6.3 How standards are regulated or constrained
The great majority of standards-setting processes incorporate some form of regular review process.  Most notable are those of the large national and international standard setting organisations.  Section 5 identified the importance of regular reviews for standards of all types, without which the standards may be inappropriate, or will lose support from stakeholders and fade away into irrelevance.  This is a regulatory and constraining mechanism. Whether the present mechanisms are comprehensive enough is an open question and needs careful examination. 

Case study: Some old regulations for management of docks and harbours remain on the statute book despite being out of date. Their review was not seen as a priority by the regulator and more relevant guidance has been produced by the industry.

Organisations like the BSI put standards out for consultation prior to publication, but external consultees might find it hard to get their concerns across for many reasons. We suggest some mechanisms for improving this stage of the process in the closing section of this report, but we feel that more attention should be given to the full mechanism whereby standards are compiled in the public interest.

Organisations like the HSE are bound by their statutory duties, in this case the HSWA 1974. However, there is a constant need for vigilance otherwise an agency may drift away from the original intent of its guiding legislation. In the case of the HSE, it could previously have expected a steer from the Health and Safety Commission and this would have been an important function of the HSC. Whether this same independent steer can be expected since the merger of the HSC and HSE in April 2008 remains to be seen.

Advice generated by single issue campaign groups is yet more difficult to regulate or constrain. On the one hand pressure groups perform a valuable function, but where specific interests impinge upon the wider activities of the general public, this ought to taken into account. However, there is no guarantee that wider interests will be accommodated. Furthermore, the quality of some of the advice given is dubious. Not all campaign groups have expertise. They may rely more upon passionate beliefs and the presumed rightness of their cause.

6.4 Unintended consequences of standards
Section 5 has described a large number of mechanisms by which standards and advice can have unintended consequences, particularly for the management of hazards in the public sector. These consequences can be substantial. We move on quickly to consider, in our concluding section, possible levers for change.

7. Concluding Section - Levers for change in the actor group’s role and influence
In this document we take a critical look at ways in which this group of risk actors could bias decisions about public risk. Because it has necessarily been a critical examination, it should not to be taken as implying that we believe the risk group is detrimental to the management of public risk. Overall we see a continuing need for standards of all kinds as an essential ingredient of the regulatory process, as originally proposed by Robens. In fact, the guiding structure of horizontal legislation (as in e.g. the HSWA) coupled with voluntary standards, codes of practice and guidance appears sound to us, as does the underlying philosophy of reasonable practicability (or reasonableness more generally) tempered with sensitivity to public concerns. However, as described in this paper, we are aware of situations in which the system, particularly when transferred to matters of public risk, can behave disproportionately. This is a serious matter because not only does it result in questionable decisions which consume public resources and damage public activities, but it potentially brings the whole system which has been carefully thought out over decades or even centuries, into disrepute. Below we suggest a number of actions which we think could improve the situation.

7.1 A new guidance document on public risk
A new document with the status of guidance such as HSE’s HSG65 or HM Treasury’s Green Book is needed dealing specifically with public risk and how it should be assessed. Current documents apply mainly to occupational risk and have been presumed also to be applicable, but as described here, there are problems. Some ground has been broken by HMT’s Orange Book and this needs to be taken further. DCSF/DCMS/Play England’s forthcoming guide on risk in children’s play provides ideas. Such a document would also make clearer the role of the safety regulators in issues of public risk and enable them to exert a more positive influence on managing the safety-benefits balance.  

Case study: Inspectors were carrying out an examination of major fall from height hazards at an historic site accessed extensively by the public.  Noting the difficulties of providing protection from falls without seriously affecting the amenity and character of the site, they declined to take enforcement action but advised that should a fatal fall occur the site operator could expect to be prosecuted.

7.2 Appropriateness of the HSWA in the domain of public risk
Elsewhere it has been suggested that the HSWA is not appropriate legislation for dealing with public risk. The case for this warrants consideration. While it can be argued that public places are sometimes places of work (e.g. people work in parks, city squares etc to construct or maintain them) and therefore come under the HSWA, and that visitors to these places also come under the Act by dint of Section 3, it seems unlikely that the authors of the HSWA intended it to apply to people enjoying architecture in public squares, canal side walks, ornithology, or to children playing in a playground.  More likely, it was intended to apply where members of the public were directly affected by work activity such as with the dropping of tools or equipment from scaffolding or the failure to barrier-off excavations in public places. For one thing, there is a subtle difference in the risk assessment process in the two situations, for in the case of the public, the benefits are important, whereas for workers carrying out their tasks the benefits are irrelevant.

7.3 Need to encourage greater transparency and consistency in standards-setting
With regard to both product standards and management standards, these should be required to be subject to compliance cost assessment or, where applicable, regulatory impact assessment, the breadth and detail of these assessments being proportionate to the envisaged social impact of the standard. These assessments should be made available at the same time as the drafts are put out for consultation, so that third parties can see the basis of the standard, underlying thought processes, envisaged cost implications and envisaged benefits, and thereby can comment more easily and more fruitfully. Trade groups and pressure groups should be encouraged to do the same, just as HM Treasury’s Green Book, written primarily for government departments, also recommends itself to other public bodies.

7.4 Need to ensure that all voices are heard, especially those concerned with benefits
In relation to public risks, the membership of standards working groups may need to be broadened to include in particular those whose interest is the benefits of things and activities. Benefits might include health (for example, the proclaimed obesity epidemic might in some way be attributable to a curtailment of sports activities, walking and cycling), quality of the natural or man-made environment, or development of risk-taking life-skills. 

7.5 Need for on-going monitoring and appraisal of advice
Recognition should be given to the fact that social interventions, including those involving risk, engage with exceedingly complex processes involving not just engineering-style considerations, but the behaviours of people and perhaps their interaction with the environment too. Therefore, the consequences of interventions are difficult to forecast with certainty and what might happen is often a matter of belief (e.g. some believe that “physical engineering controls and safeguards are more reliable than relying solely on people”​[39]​ but this position is contested e.g. Adams ibid). For this reason it is important that more effort is put into monitoring and evaluating the effects of interventions and, if necessary, revising them. Although all risk management cycles, including ROAMEF, stress the need to monitor the effectiveness and other consequences of interventions, it is more commonly the case that measures are implemented with comparatively little follow-up (Jarvis et al. ibid). En passant, additional emphasis on completing the cycle has implications for budgets, in particular the ratio of capital to revenue investment, because monitoring, evaluation and contingency for intervention modification require revenue expenditure.​[40]​

7.6 Need to include in the preamble of standards relevant advice for the courts
When standards and advice are being drafted consideration should be given to how they might be used in any subsequent legal proceedings. Akin to a disclaimer or health warning, the preamble needs to make clear statements about the scope, rigour, uncertainties and any other limitations in order to avoid the possibility of misleading the courts.

7.7 The education of risk assessors
If the suggestions here for a new approach to the assessment of public risk are taken up, a need will emerge to examine the education of risk assessors.

7.8 Encourage local production of advice and standards
As noted in the introduction, Lord Robens was of the view that statutory regulation should not be made where the objectives might be made just as well (or better) by non-statutory guidance or codes of practice.  In a similar vein the Better Regulation Commission​[41]​ expressed a view that the responsibility for managing risk should be left with those best placed to manage it.  Applying these conclusions to standards setters reinforces our view that there is much potential benefit in producing standards as close as possible to the point at which the risk is being experienced and managed in terms of stakeholders producing documents which are current, relevant, and accessible. However, this would need to be done within a process which ensured that the stakeholder needs were being met without domination by narrow factions or single-interest groups, and that ensured the output was regularly reviewed.

7.9 Explicit approval by regulators of standards and standards-making processes
Producing standards which are more ‘local’ to the risk carries with it a danger that the result may not be consistent or compatible with the viewpoint of the regulator.  Traditionally, regulators have been reluctant to give their endorsement to processes or policies produced by others (a notable exception being the Play Safety Forum’s ‘Managing Risk in Play Provision’). We would like to see the regulators being more forthcoming in endorsing other’s work, even if this did place on them a degree of risk in becoming associated with the processes they are seeing to regulate. We feel that the benefits from doing this would far outweigh this additional risk. These benefits would be particularly great in the area of public risk where the regulators produce very little compared with their output for occupational risk.

7.10 Time to consider ‘no fault compensation’?


























A response: points made by standard setters in an event to discuss this research  

The role of standards
Standards are used for a range of purposes, and by a wide range of groups, from business to the public sector.  They are used to encourage quality, consistency and compatibility across a sector, especially between industries and interest groups.  They can also encourage consistency between countries, which is important for making comparisons and good decision making.  Standards are used as a form of self-regulation in areas where government fail to regulate or where industry strongly desires self-regulation as a form of better regulation.  Standards are also used as they help defend decisions when challenged in courts or by regulators, and to help build consumer and stakeholder confidence in their industry or products

Standards may be produced that promote certain policies, for example government policies to protect the public interest.   They may clarify what is required to comply with legislation, especially where legislation is not in plain English and standards are required to interpret what the legislation says.

Groups that influence standards
The process of standard setting usually relies upon the efforts of committees or working groups, sometimes organised through a standards organisation such as BSI. The most likely persons able to offer the considerable time necessary to contribute to a standard are those with commercial interests, professional groups and those employed by organisations with a particular policy interest in the objective.  Involving a range of stakeholders, not just those who are passionate about the area or who have a commercial interest, is difficult and there is often an imbalance in the stakeholders involved in the development of a standard (for example beach safety standards will be driven by stakeholder groups such as local authorities and lifeguards but are unlikely to include the views of average British families).  Independent experts can be essential to bring perspective and objectivity to standard setting.

Industry may have specialist technical knowledge, and has an interest in creating standards that it can meet.   It may have a focus on its commercial interests rather than the public interest. Trade associations are important to ensure cross-industry representation and to mitigate undue commercial influence.  Some standards are made by powerful businesses – for example Microsoft is the largest standards body in the world. In such cases commercial interests often dominate, as it is very difficult to engage consumers, general public etc.

Insurers can also have a direct effect on the development of standards, for example influencing standards for locks because of the link with house contents insurance.  In general however insurers are often users of standards rather than developers but may influence local standards through out of court settlements or insisting on specific requirements for risk control.

The media also has a role to play.  Although they are not involved in determining the content of the standard, they can create the agenda which may be taken forward by others, in particular lobby groups, who press for a standard. 

Issues with standards
Risks relating to standards use include overuse – for example an unnecessary requirement that everyone having to be trained on a specific piece of equipment.  They can be used as box ticking exercise can mean that people do not think for themselves.  Education is vital for the appropriate use of standards.  

If standards are set too high, too stringently or are used inappropriately then they may conflict with government policies such as value for money.  There may also be other problems caused by overly strict standards, for example the benefit lost of complying with too 'safe' a standard, for example in children’s playgrounds.  If standards are driven too much by dominant market players then competition can be reduced and the consumer loses out ultimately.

Large procurers may often apply standards in a ‘lazy’ way, passing the requirement to comply on to their contractor in the belief that this will help to manage risks.  This causes a problem for small and medium sized enterprises who find it more difficult to meet the procurers’ requirements.

When incorrectly applied standards may stifle innovation.  However when applied intelligently they can be an important driver of innovation.  

There are a large number and range of bodies who are introducing standards; it would very difficult to identify all standard setters. In some areas there is a risk of having too many standards – can lead to complication or confusion as consumers unsure which standard to trust.  In some cases standard setting can become a self perpetuating activity – development of new standards, reviewing and updating existing standards, amending standards, responding to "flavour of the month" ideas.
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